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SIGNATURES OF THE IMPOSSIBLE
RANJANA KHANNA*

I. INTRODUCTION
What’s in a name? Halley’s article takes as its starting point masculine
identification in the signature “Ian Halley.” But the designation of Ian as a
“masculine” name perhaps causes one to fall into a trap that Halley has set for
readers. Pointing out the “gender” of a name, particularly in a language that
does not inscribe gender in nouns, adjectives, or past participles, commits a
feminist error of always inscribing gender or attributing discrimination along
gendered lines to every aspect of living. Gender thus carries the attributes of
value. It is from Ian’s performative and phantasmatic iteration that Halley engages two writers, Leo Bersani and Duncan Kennedy, who adopt a “queer”
theoretical position that must, in Halley’s view, depart from feminism. Decrying a form of moralism apparently endemic to contemporary feminism, Halley
gives a reading of cultural feminism’s roots in some of the more radical provocations from MacKinnon and Dworkin, only to underscore how contemporary
feminism, for better and for worse, has rejected all that was radical in those al1
ready highly problematic positions.

* Ranjana Khanna is Associate Professor of English, the Program in Literature, and Women’s
Studies at Duke University. She works on Anglo- and Francophone Postcolonial theory and literature, Psychoanalysis, and Feminist theory. She has published on a variety of topics, including transnational feminism, psychoanalysis, autobiography, postcolonial agency, multiculturalism in an international context, postcolonial Joyce, Area Studies and Women’s Studies, and Algerian film. Her
book DARK CONTINENTS: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND COLONIALISM appeared from Duke University Press
in 2003. She has recently completed a book manuscript entitled ALGERIA CUTS: WOMEN AND
REPRESENTATION 1830 TO THE PRESENT. Her current book manuscript in progress is called ASYLUM:
THE CONCEPT AND THE PRACTICE.
Acknowledgments: Many thanks to Jody Greene for helping me clarify melancholic politics, and to
Joanna Hodge, for peripatetic rambling in Hyde Park. I would also like to acknowledge conversations with Alberto Moreiras which indirectly contributed to some thoughts emerging in this article.
1. Ian Halley, Queer Theory By Men, 11 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 7 (2004). Halley uses several
articles as reference points, including: Leo Bersani, Is the Rectum a Grave? 43 OCTOBER 197 (1987), reprinted in AIDS: CULTURAL ANALYSIS, CULTURAL ACTIVISM 197 (Douglas Crimp ed., 1996); Duncan
Kennedy, Sexual Abuse, Sexy Dressing, and the Eroticization of Domination, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1309
(1992), reprinted in DUNCAN KENNEDY, SEXY DRESSING ETC. 126 (1993); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON,
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW (1987). Halley also implicitly addresses Andrea Dworkin’s works. ANDREA DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN (1981) [hereinafter PORNOGRAPHY]; ANDREA DWORKIN, INTERCOURSE (1987) [hereinafter INTERCOURSE]. For an interesting and wonderfully written critique of the pornography debates, see Mary Joe Frug, A
Postmodern Feminist Legal Manifesto, in POSTMODERN LEGAL FEMINISM 125 (1992). Frug’s analysis
leads her to plead that she not be seen as anti-feminist for opposing the ordinances set forth by
MacKinnon and Dworkin. Duncan Kennedy’s thinking follows in Frug’s vein.
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MacKinnon and Dworkin would call upon the law to reject its “male” position, condemning sex, and the violence that for them necessarily is involved in
2
heterosexual intercourse. They failed to acknowledge the pleasures of violence
or debasement, and they continued to have absolute faith in the power of the
3
law to effectuate change in women’s cultural, economic, and political realms.
Cultural feminism, drawing on a similar view of masculine forms of violence,
4
condemns the undervaluing of values and sexual practices deemed “feminine.”
It insists upon the value of that which has been subordinated, that is, the feminine. According to Halley, imbuing the subordinated with intrinsically positive
value also occurs in some queer theory in which power of the subordinated becomes linked to the attribution of value, and the forms of signification that fol5
low. When Halley appreciates the argument that ensues, however, she reads
queer studies as offering a parody of the feminist move because of its far more
6
radical sense of sexuality. In an earlier draft of Halley’s article, authorship was
signified, and therefore a certain authority given over to, a signature which has
here been substituted: Janet Halley became Ian Halley. I note that copyright is
still held by Janet in Ian’s article, and I ask myself why that may be. If Janet Halley owns the words of Ian Halley, what is suggested about the constitution of
the self, responsibility, and agency designated in the signature and in the name
of the copyright holder? Perhaps the “true” copyright ought to belong to a
“Halley who is divided, multiplied, conjugated, shared,” and perhaps even to
7
Bersani and Kennedy, MacKinnon and Dworkin. Janet seems particularly keen
to maintain ownership of Ian, and in some ways continues to insist her presence
even though she presents herself as absent. I note also that this was once a talk,
but I will confine myself to the dynamics of written communication, and the
meanings that emerge in signatures, because I was not present for the oral per-

2. See generally MACKINNON, supra note 1; DWORKIN, INTERCOURSE , supra note 1.
3. Halley, supra note 1, at 17-18 (discussing this in the context of Bersani’s departure from
MacKinnon).
4. It is unclear to me who Halley has in mind when she discusses cultural feminism, but some
figures that fit broadly into this paradigm are JOSEPHINE DONOVAN, FEMINIST THEORY: THE
INTELLECTUAL TRADITIONS OF AMERICAN FEMINISM (1992) and SANDRA GILBERT & SUSAN GUBAR, THE
MADWOMAN IN THE ATTIC (1979).
5. See, e.g., Halley, supra note 1, at 15, 17-18 (discussing Bersani).
6. This seems to be why she is less critical of Bersani’s endorsement of gay sexuality than of
feminism’s, as if gay sex was in and of itself radical. It is true that Bersani’s argument throughout
the essay stresses the dark underside of what has been deemed negative. It is not, however, the case
that the basic structure of evaluation changes in Bersani’s endorsement in a way that is radically different from cultural feminism’s. There may well be different agendas and different consequences,
but the value-form remains present. See Halley, supra note 1, at 19-26.
7. Jacques Derrida has written on the problem of ownership, acknowledgment, and the constitution of a unitary self. See generally JACQUES DERRIDA, Limited Inc a b c . . . (1977), reprinted in LIMITED
INC 29 (Samuel Weber trans. & Gerald Graff ed., 1988) [hereinafter DERRIDA, Limited]. He addresses
his remarks to John Searle who had criticized Derrida’s essay entitled Signature Event Context (1972),
reprinted in LIMITED INC 1 (Alan Bass trans. & Gerald Graff ed., 1988) [hereinafter DERRIDA, Signature]. I am altering Derrida’s words here, when he writes “the true copyright ought to belong (as is
indeed suggested along the frame of this tableau vivant) to a Searle who is divided, multiplied, conjugated, shared. What a complicated signature!” DERRIDA, Limited, supra, at 31.
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8

formance. My response will consider the question of value, what was remaindered in the substitution of Janet for Ian, and the constitution of the self sometimes proposed in the proffering of a signature.
II. TAKING A BREAK, DISAVOWAL, AND THE DISSOLUTION OF THE EGO
Halley’s article proposes that it would be good both for feminism, and for
9
“left/liberal/progressives” to “Take a Break from Feminism.” In a classic expression of disavowal, the logic of which Octave Mannoni succinctly described
10
in the phrase “I know very well, but even so . . . ,” Halley writes:
There are many good reasons to think [taking a break from feminism] is a bad
idea. . . . In this essay I hope it will be permissible to circumscribe my goal: I
want to provide an elaboration, in a somewhat high degree of detail, of some
conceptual moves that may be possible only if one pursues a divergence be11
tween feminism and queer theory as I imagine it.

Feminism is circumscribed, queer theory is full of imaginative possibility.
Feminism is known to insist upon its importance, nagging that it is a bad idea to
leave it behind. But even so, Halley’s version of the necessity for queer theory’s
divergence from feminism involves a conscious choice to ignore the nagging, as
well as the ambiguities to which it gives rise. In this gesture “feminism,” in
spite of the lip service given to “sex positive” feminism, as well as those feminisms whose agenda is not that of MacKinnon or cultural feminists, apparently
needs to be rejected. What remains of feminism’s important questions, and its
nagging, is therefore left behind. I would furthermore suggest that Halley’s relationship to it is unresolved. This allows Halley to give queer theory a utopian
quality, and simultaneously see feminism only in terms of its manifested limitations.
Not only does feminism provide the model for valuation of the subordinated, in Halley’s nominalist version, feminism is plagued by a need to distinguish between m and f (whether male/female; masculine/feminine; or men and
women). As queer theory does not have to rest its case on this binary of gender
according to Halley, it would serve it well to take a break from feminism. Two
important questions arise from this: (1) does feminism, any more or less than
queer theory, really have to be primarily about gender and the logic of m/f?
(That is, didn’t “difference” feminism already tackle this problem?); and (2)
12
what is compromised when the “supplement of gender” is not only critiqued,
remaindered, and exchanged, but actually left behind and abandoned?

8. I am gesturing towards an idea of signature discussed later in this article, and drawing on
Jacques Derrida’s essay Signature Event Context, supra note 7. Derrida draws on the work of J.L. Austin, when Austin writes, interpolating his readers/audience in his explanation of communication
with the use of the possessive “our,” “Still confining ourselves, for simplicity, to spoken utterance.”
J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS 113 (1962).
9. Halley, supra note 1, at 9.
10. OCTAVE MANNONI, Je sais bien, mais quand même, in CLEFS POUR L’IMAGINAIRE 9 (1969).
11. Halley, supra note 1, at 9.
12. By “supplement of gender,” I mean, in this context, the way in which gender difference, as
understood by feminism, is deemed irrelevant while at the same time resulting in the subordination
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Halley refers to a “divergentist” theory, which recognizes and underscores
the different political agendas among feminists and queer theorists and activists,
as a way in which one may deal with distinctions among political and theoreti13
cal positions between feminist and queer studies. In this attempt to divert the
two fields and theoretical bodies, however, she exaggerates differences and does
not attend to the problems of diversion that may arise. She claims that “convergentist” logic, which tries to make necessary the coexistence or intersectionality
of a variety of liberal/leftist positions around gender, sexuality, and indeed class
and race, conflate different agendas in ways that do not allow attention to the
14
differences and divergences. It would seem to me, however, that the logic involved in both divergentist and convergentist agendas is the same, and it leads
15
to the exclusion of alterity at the moment of conceiving political possibility.
Halley’s appreciative departure from Bersani and Kennedy, who explicitly
attempt to re-think questions of sexuality in the post-AIDS moment in the
United States, involves pitting their theories with and against feminist taxono16
mies in the United States today. Both writers acknowledge great debt to forms
of feminism that have disabused us of too-rosy concepts of sexuality, and the
normative and bourgeois ideas of good and bad sexual practices and fantasies
17
that accompany this. They both offer critiques of some feminist thinkers; they
also are greatly indebted, and feel no need to leave feminism itself entirely behind. Duncan Kennedy thinks of himself as not a “feminist any more than he
18
thinks of himself as a black nationalist,” but writes this in light of the influence
on him of Jane Gallop, Judith Butler, and Mary Joe Frug (in memory of whom
Kennedy’s essay is dedicated). The implicit point is that he does not see feminism as an identity position, but he finds some feminist work rather useful in its
structuralist and post-structuralist veins. The whole essay is, in some ways, a
protracted relation to the feminist thinker to whom it is dedicated. Hardly laying feminism to rest, it is a thinking through of the limitations of some feminisms in light of others. It is true that the desire to not count oneself as a feminist is a dismissal of a certain position, but the criticism of some feminisms
(particularly governance feminism) is hardly news in the feminist academy. A
feminist, more often than not, is someone who does some form of feminist work,
just as a post-structuralist is someone who does some post-structuralist work. A

of one gender by another, thus being remaindered because its demands cannot be met by the supposedly “gender-free” discourse put in its place.
13. Halley, supra note 1, at 46 n.134.
14. See id. at 29.
15. For interesting, but I think ultimately flawed notions of the “intersections” of race and sex,
see Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139;
Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence
Against Women of Color, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT
357 (Kimberlé Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995). Wendy Brown’s essay, Suffering the Paradoxes of Rights,
gives an excellent summary of a variety of arguments against the notion of intersectionality, explaining how different modalities of power do not end up constituting subjects who are formed in discrete relations to these powers. Wendy Brown, Suffering the Paradoxes of Rights, in LEFT
LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE 420-34 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002).
16. See Halley, supra note 1, at 14-38.
17. Bersani, supra note 1, at 212-15; KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 150-58.
18. KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 129.
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feminist is not necessarily, and in fact is not usually, simply someone who identifies with the most banal form of outdated or misguided feminism. Indeed,
19
some define feminism as critique precisely because of its self-critical attitude.
Bersani, who discusses the “value of sexuality itself . . . (as the demeaning of) the seri20
ousness of efforts to redeem it” after having discussed feminist attempts to redeem
it, nonetheless sees their feminist analysis of sexuality as demeaning as the
groundwork for his own discussion. It is Bersani’s essay that will become the
focus of my response to Halley.
Bersani begins provocatively with the statement, “[t]here is a big secret
21
about sex: most people don’t like it.” This does not, of course, mean that most
people do not have it. Following Catharine MacKinnon’s insights around forms
of debasement women experience in heterosexual sex, Bersani writes of how this
is a position that needs acknowledgment as attractive as well as potentially abu22
sive. In MacKinnon’s rendition, by contrast, there is no room for men to ex23
perience or enjoy feelings of debasement. They are always positioned as aggressors; and debasement is always considered negatively. Halley concurs with
24
Bersani on this point. She ambiguously departs from him, however, in a problem that she sees as deriving from cultural feminism: the value ascribed to the
25
subordinate. Whereas MacKinnon was unequivocal in her condemnation, Ber26
sani insists on the value of the subordinate position. It is from this position that
he can criticize the murderously puritanical mainstream representation of AIDS,
and the equally lethal evaluation of good sex and bad sex, particularly in state
sponsored campaigns, in principle aiming to reduce the spread of HIV, but in
27
practice geared toward the lowest risk groups. Embracing abjection as a mo19. And perhaps needless to say, given my tone, many feminists like myself are increasingly
frustrated by the characterization of feminism which fails to take into account the very complex and
varied historical relations with Marxism, liberalism, psychoanalysis, socialism and other social
movements only to be redeemed by something vaguely designated “postmodern.” I suppose I
would count as a postmodern feminist, albeit with a psychoanalytic and postcolonial touch, but the
lack of precision of the term “postmodern” leaves it designating nothing other than post-1968 cultural theory. Deconstructive, Lacanian, and Foucaultian readings are, after all, not the same even
though they may all be sexily postmodern in the accounts given by Frug, supra note 1, passim and
KENNEDY, supra note 1, passim. Greater attention to this vagueness would be welcome in words that
critique some feminist positions or practices for good reason.
20. Bersani, supra note 1, at 222.
21. Id. at 197.
22. He writes:
Needless to say, the ideological exploitations of this fantasmatic potential have a long and
inglorious history. It is mainly a history of male power, and by now it has been richly
documented by others. I want to approach this subject from a quite different angle, and to
argue that a gravely dysfunctional aspect of what is, after all, the healthy pleasure we take
in the operation of a coordinated and strong physical organism is the temptation to deny
the perhaps equally strong appeal of powerlessness, of the loss of control.
Id. at 216-17.
23. MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 3, 6-7.
24. Halley, supra note 1, at 17.
25. Halley, supra note 1, at 20-21.
26. Bersani, supra note 1, at 217.
27. Bersani writes about these campaigns, “TV treats us to nauseating processions of yuppie
women announcing to the world that they will no longer put out for their yuppie boyfriends unless
these boyfriends agree to use a condom.” Bersani, supra note 1, at 202. This statement is, of course,
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ment of the undoing of self, in which uncontrollable regressive identifications
cannot come to fruition, he writes, “[t]he self is a practical convenience; pro28
moted to the status of an ethical ideal, it is a sanction for violence.” He adds in
a footnote, “[t]his sentence could be rephrased, and elaborated, in Freudian
terms, as the difference between the ego’s function of ‘reality-testing’ and the
29
superego’s moral violence (against the ego).” The super-ego, in Freudian theory, constitutes a regulatory mechanism through which “conscience” violently
imposes itself on the ego. As I will explain, the ego’s relation to reality-testing,
when hindered by melancholia, can challenge the notion of sovereignty and
30
selfhood that relies on moral violence.
I have no interest at all in responding to Halley in a defense of all kinds of
feminism. In many of its renditions, I also find feminism regressive and misguided. I do not dispute the idea that a whole range of mistakes have been
made by feminists and in the name of feminism, ranging from misguided wellmeaning gestures to deliberately regressive and reactionary moves that are
complicit with and fail to critique a dominant politics, whether of the puritanical
and murderous, neo-liberal late capitalist, or the conservative imperial ilk.
Rather than defending a movement that has undeniably at times been guilty, I
will propose why leaving feminism behind, and believing that it can be left behind, is itself a politically and conceptually misguided ploy that is complicit
with a neo-liberal heterosexist paradigm. Rather than disavowal, I will propose
melancholia.

difficult to read in terms of feminism. It is strange to think of Bersani as being for Halley in some
ways too much of a feminist. But the difficulty of the reading is perhaps Halley’s larger point. How
do feminists assess both the statement and the yuppie women? Will these “yuppie women” inevitably be endorsed (possibly by some varieties of culturalist feminism)? Will Bersani’s statement be
seen as evidence of misogyny (possibly by MacKinnonite and Dworkian feminists)? Is simply ignoring the statement’s figuring of woman what queer theory should do, in Halley’s view? Or could
feminists intervene here with a simultaneous acknowledgment of the annoying nature of the yuppie,
of the media coverage, and of Bersani’s statement? Of course, Bersani is objecting primarily to the
media coverage of women, and yet the yuppie women also receive derogatory treatment for the adjustment in their sexual practices. They become abject beings and therefore “nauseating.” Isn’t the
point here that Bersani is criticizing the media for always paying attention to the population least at
risk, thus neglecting violently those whom AIDS has most deeply affected, and also manufacturing
prejudice? Abjected, those women are perhaps more accurately absent and erased than humiliated.
See also Leo Bersani, Gay Presence, in HOMOS 11 (1995). Douglas Crimp also writes extensively on the
reactionary, moralistic, and dangerously bigoted response to HIV/AIDS by the State, the media,
and, importantly, by some queer activists. See generally DOUGLAS CRIMP, MELANCHOLIA AND
MORALISM: ESSAYS ON AIDS AND QUEER POLITICS (2002). Crimp merges disavowal and melancholia
in a manner that I find a little puzzling, but his main argument concerning the need to understand
the process of mourning and the peculiarly regressive forms of reaction to AIDS is very useful. See
id.
28. Bersani, supra note 1, at 222.
29. Id. Bersani is drawing on distinctions discussed by Sigmund Freud. See SIGMUND FREUD,
Mourning and Melancholia (1917), reprinted in 14 THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE
PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 243, 243-60 (James Strachey trans. & ed., Hogarth Press
1964) [hereinafter FREUD, Mourning]; SIGMUND FREUD, The Ego and the Id (1923), reprinted in 19 THE
STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 12, 19-27 (James
Strachey trans. & ed., Hogarth Press 1961) [hereinafter FREUD, Ego].
30. See generally FREUD, Ego, supra note 29.
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Disavowal functions in terms of the “superego’s moral violence,” and the
wrong-minded attempt to erase entirely the history of a radical movement with
a complicated history. Melancholia is an “undoing of self,” and the melancholic
is unable to let anything simply go. Melancholia is inhospitable to forms of
identity or community formation that rest on a structure of mourning and identification with dominant or subordinate groups. Even though feminism has indeed been involved in supporting major miscarriages of justice, I will argue that
feminism as a whole is not the problem Halley needs to address. As a justiceseeking project unafraid of removing the grounds from which it has sometimes
misguidedly pronounced, feminism, like queer politics and theory, and in coalition rather than convergence with it, may offer, through its nagging presence,
constant critique. Like queer studies, it can, and more often than not does, go
beyond the category of gender, and not just in its holy alliance with race and
class, or in the concept of intersectionality of various discourses. Feminism, no
more or less than queer studies, also acknowledges the failure of the concept of
the subject containing various discourses of race, class, and gender, because
these are never separable. As Douglas Crimp has argued, drawing on notions of
ethico-political responsibility in Thomas Keenan’s work, which in turn draws
from Jacques Derrida’s, there is equally a complacent, dangerous, and politically
regressive queer activism that must be critiqued in order to understand respon31
sibly. Understanding anything responsibly involves an ability to respond implied within the term “responsibility.” There should be no fear of removing all
grounds from which responsible or moral actions are usually conducted as and
when they are inadequate to the task of moving toward justice. For Crimp this
does not mean a rejection of queer theory itself. I would say the same for feminism, and it is through a similarly melancholic politics that I derive this conclusion.
Neither feminism nor queer activism are reducible to the forms of violation
or abuse they have historically explicitly rejected or endorsed. Feminism is not
the problem, moralistic evaluation and its deadly consequences are. Equally,
feminism per se does not have to fall prey to the attribution of causality to copula
logic, which I understand as assuming the relation between what happens to
one woman and what happens to women more generally. The gesture of
“speaking for” women that is suggested in the odd configuration of “speaking
as a woman” is an example of such causal logic, and it assumes that the copula,
that is the connection between the subject and the predicate, can be identical.
What is remaindered, of course, is the supplement of difference—what else is
one besides a woman when one speaks “as a woman?” What differences are
embedded in the concept “woman” that are forgotten as soon as a commonality
among women is assumed? Some feminists, particularly those informed by
structuralism and some forms of psychoanalysis, simply see gender as the

31. See generally CRIMP, supra note 27; THOMAS KEENAN, FABLES OF RESPONSIBILITY: ABERRATIONS
PREDICAMENTS IN ETHICS AND POLITICS (1997). Jacques Derrida’s work has also frequently explored the notion of responsibility. See, e.g., JACQUES DERRIDA, ACTS OF RELIGION (Gil Anidjar ed.,
2002); JACQUES DERRIDA, WITHOUT ALIBI (Peggy Kamuf trans., 2002); JACQUES DERRIDA, OF
HOSPITALITY (Rachel Bowlby trans., 2000); JACQUES DERRIDA, SPECTRES OF MARX: THE STATE OF THE
DEBT, THE WORK OF MOURNING, AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL (Peggy Kamuf trans., 1994) [hereinafter DERRIDA, SPECTRES OF MARX].
AND
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ground from which all else follows and emerges, taking note of the “supplement
of copula” at the same time. Indeed, it has been the dominant strain of feminist
theory in the past twenty years to critique the position that one presumes to
32
speak for all women when one speaks “as a woman.” As Judith Butler, respectfully protesting against Gayle Rubin’s argument for distinct and discrete
formulations of feminist and queer politics, puts it, “But when and where feminism refuses to derive gender from sex or from sexuality, feminism appears to be part of
the very critical practice that contests the heterosexual matrix, pursuing the specific social organization of each of these relations as well as their capacity for social transforma33
tion.”
Butler herself references a connection between psychoanalytic and Foucaultian theory to formulate her own sense through which gender is formulated in
relation to homosexual desire, which is the unknown lost object of the modern
34
subject. Thus homosexual desire will always threaten the gendered ego. While
Butler draws on a theory of melancholia in Freudian psychoanalysis, she is also
implicitly drawn to what many would consider to be a basic tenet of psycho35
analysis—the primacy of the sexualized libido in the constitution of the self. In
many ways, she echoes Bersani’s (and to some extent Halley’s) own plea for the
exclusivity of gender and sexuality discourse in the disintegration of the self.
This disintegration of self would be the dissolution of the subject, even of one
who rejects selfhood. Without this self, of course, the relative merits of disintegration could not be judged, and it would not be masochistic in any usual sense
of the term. Butler departs from the sexual scenario, however, in the final pages
of The Psychic Life of Power, with the reminder that melancholia is not all about
sexuality, or necessarily about gender. For her, it is about the trace, that supplement that has become remaindered but insists on its presence covertly:
The ego comes into being on the condition of the “trace” of the other, who is, at
that moment of emergence, already at a distance. To accept the autonomy of the
ego is to forget that trace; and to accept that trace is to embark upon a process of

32. See Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Can the Subaltern Speak?, in MARXISM AND THE
INTERPRETATION OF CULTURE 271 (Cary Nelson & Lawrence Grossberg eds., 1988). In The Supplement
of Copula, Jacques Derrida writes of the figure of copula—the joining word suggesting identical existence of the subject and the predicate—as the emergence of supplementarity. The word “is,” for example, always suggests the possibility of non-identicality, and is the carrier of the supplement characterizing the other’s singularity. The copula, in its attempt to assert the self-same, actually always
forces the possibility, or rather, inevitability, of difference. JACQUES DERRIDA, The Supplement of Copula: Philosophy Before Linguistics, reprinted in MARGINS OF PHILOSOPHY 175, 196 (Alan Bass trans.,
1982). Whenever the copula exists, it carries within it the supplement of the predicate which exceeds
the subject itself. Id. at 200-03.
33. Judith Butler, Against Proper Objects, in FEMINISM MEETS QUEER THEORY 1, 12 (Elizabeth
Weed & Naomi Schor eds., 1997). But see Gayle Rubin, Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the
Politics of Sexuality, in PLEASURE AND DANGER: EXPLORING FEMALE SEXUALITY 267, 300-09 (Carole S.
Vance ed., 1984). Halley does indeed comment on this passage, but insists that this notion of gender
and sexuality should not be conceived as feminist. See generally Halley, supra note 1.
34. See generally JUDITH BUTLER, THE PSYCHIC LIFE OF POWER: THEORIES IN SUBJECTION (1997).
35. See generally JEAN LAPLANCHE & JEAN-BAPTISTE PONTALIS, THE LANGUAGE OF PSYCHOANALYSIS (Donald Nicholson-Smith trans., 1973). This standard dictionary of psychoanalysis by
Laplanche and Pontalis understands most psychoanalytic categories in this light.
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mourning that can never be complete, for no final severance could take place
36
without dissolving the ego.

I will ultimately depart from Butler on this final point concerning the dissolution
of the ego because it seems to me that the ego is constituted as a whole only with
the extra-ego trace as it is manifested in the super-ego. Melancholia, it seems to
me, is always a threat to the ego. The ego does not simply become constituted
through a dependence on the melancholic trace’s nagging, repressed insistence.
Melancholia is the affect brought about through the trace, the supplement,
the non-identical and inassimilable, which threatens the constitution of the
modern subject that cannot accept its demands. It runs counter to the super-ego,
but not as the id. It works toward the dissolution of ego, and its modern, liberal,
and humanistic constitution. The self-contained sovereign subject does not depend on it in anyway. Rather, its very constitution is threatened by it.
The resurgence of thought about mourning and melancholia in recent years
has been remarkable. Almost all the work related to the subject has drawn from
psychoanalysis, or, in a slightly different vein, from Walter Benjamin’s work on
German tragic drama and left melancholy, but the focus has not exclusively
been on sexuality in the case of the former, or on the Holocaust in the case of the
37
latter. AIDS and millennium hysteria, as well as the fall of Communism seem
to be contributing factors, alongside a delayed traumatic response to the horrors
of world wars, anti-colonial struggles, and late capitalist fundamentalisms.
What underlies most mournful responses is attachment to and identification
with a group or community. Melancholia, especially when theorized through
Freud, involves a critical relation to community, often a disidentification, and is
accompanied by a kind of disintegration of the self occurring as a result of this
unresolved relation which is impossible to assimilate to a “self.” The melancholic always encloses within it a “supplement of copula,” which is not equivalent to an “I.” There is always something that initially appears to be part of the
subject, but is subsequently understood as external to it, and therefore nonidentical with it. The non-identical supplement is a nagging presence undoing
the self through a critical agency. The ambivalent relation to that which is lost
engenders a critical agency directed toward the self and thus toward the very
concept of selfhood endorsed by the self-consolidating nature of community
identification.

36.
37.

BUTLER, supra note 34, at 196.
See, e.g., ANNE CHENG, THE MELANCHOLY OF RACE: PSYCHOANALYSIS, ASSIMILATION, AND
HIDDEN GRIEF (2000); CRIMP, supra note 27; DERRIDA, SPECTRES OF MARX, supra note 31; DAVID ENG,
RACIAL CASTRATION: MANAGING MASCULINITY IN ASIAN AMERICA (2001); LOSS: THE POLITICS OF
MOURNING (David Eng & David Kazanjian eds., 2003); RANJANA KHANNA, DARK CONTINENTS:
PSYCHOANALYSIS AND COLONIALISM (2003); JOSÉ ESTEBAN MUÑOZ, DISIDENTIFICATIONS: QUEERS OF
COLOR AND THE PERFORMANCE OF POLITICS (1999); GILLIAN ROSE, MOURNING BECOMES THE LAW
(1996); Wendy Brown, Resisting Left Melancholy (Left Conservatism: A Workshop), 26 BOUNDARY 2 19,
19-27 (1999). The relevant sources for much of this scholarship include: NICOLAS ABRAHAM & MARIA
TOROK, Mourning or Melancholia: Introjection versus Incorporation, in THE SHELL AND THE KERNEL 125
(Nicholas T. Rand ed. & trans., 1994); WALTER BENJAMIN, THE ORIGIN OF GERMAN TRAGIC DRAMA
(John Osborne trans., 1977); Walter Benjamin, Left-wing Melancholy, in THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC
SOURCEBOOK 304 (Anton Kaes et al. eds., 1994).
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But Bersani’s notion of the disintegration of the self is more focused on the
exclusive way in which sexuality is formulated in feminist texts, and he brings
38
his own background in psychoanalysis to bear on this work. Halley criticizes
him for his valuation, and perhaps “celebration” of the subordinated figure,
echoing as it does cultural feminism’s apparent validation of all things sup39
pressed that are rendered feminine. Bersani implicitly valorizes a common
thread between the MacKinnonite version of women’s relation to sexuality that
MacKinnon cannot validate herself, but which, according to Bersani, does a
40
good job of assessing in terms of subordination and humiliation. He understands subordination, however, in terms of a psychoanalytically conceived jouissance, a state of extreme pleasure and pain beyond all recognition of anything
41
commonly understood as happiness or pleasure in the ego. Writing of a “selfshattering” that is distinct from an anecdotal “masochism to which the melancholy of the post-Oedipal superego’s moral masochism is wholly alien,” Bersani
proposes a disintegration distinct from one which could be discussed within the
42
terms of an already existing sovereign subject. I would depart slightly from
Bersani’s phrasing here. His proposal of the “melancholy of the post-Oedipal
43
superego” runs counter to my own understanding of melancholia. Freud theo44
rized the superego only in 1923. While it is true that Freud refashioned his notion of “critical agency” as the “conscience” of the morally regulating and normalizing superego, this critical agency was no longer melancholic. His concept
of melancholia remained unresolved, but the “critical agency” of melancholia
was understood as “diseased” because of an ambivalence felt toward the thing
45
lost. Ambivalent rather than judgmental, the ego is undone by melancholia,
not reaffirmed in its sovereignty through compliance to the demands of the su46
perego.
For Bersani, this queer jouissance is quite different from that experienced by
any other marginalized or abused groups. He writes:

38. Bersani discusses his work THE FREUDIAN BODY: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND ART (1986) in his article, Is the Rectum a Grave? Bersani, supra note 1, at 217-18.
39. Halley, supra note 1, at 20-22.
40. Bersani, supra note 1, at 214-15.
41. Id. at 222. I note in passing Tim Dean’s interesting reminder that Bersani derives his notion
of pleasure more from Bataille than from the Lacanian psychoanalysis one might expect. Tim Dean,
The Psychoanalysis of AIDS, 63 OCTOBER 83, 115 (1993). It seems to me, however, that even though
there are great distinctions between Bataille and Lacan, the latter draw from a common pool of psychoanalytic and surrealist thinking on the subject. David Macey probably overstates the case of Lacan’s surrealism, but his book LACAN IN CONTEXTS is nonetheless informative on this matter. See
DAVID MACEY, LACAN IN CONTEXTS (1989). Bersani brings psychoanalysis and Bataille together, writing: “From the Freudian perspective, we might say that Bataille reformulates this self-shattering into
the sexual as a kind of nonanecdotal self-debasement, as a masochism to which the melancholy of
the post-Oedipal super-ego’s moral masochism is wholly alien, and in which, so to speak, the self is
exuberantly discarded.” Bersani, supra note 1, at 217-18.
42. Bersani, supra note 1, at 217-18.
43. Id.
44. See FREUD, Ego, supra note 29.
45. FREUD, Mourning, supra note 29, at 256-57.
46. Id. at 256-58. I have discussed this concept of melancholia more fully in my book. See
KHANNA, supra note 37.
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An authentic gay male political identity therefore implies a struggle not only
against definitions of maleness and of homosexuality as they are reiterated and
imposed in a heterosexist social discourse, but also against those very same
definitions so seductively and so faithfully reflected by those (in large part culturally invented and elaborated) male bodies that we carry within us as permanently renewable sources of excitement.
There is, however, perhaps a way to explode this ideological body. I want to
propose, instead of a denial of what I take to be important (if politically unpleasant) truths about male homosexual desire, an arduous representational discipline. The sexist power that defines maleness in most human cultures can easily survive social revolutions; what it perhaps cannot survive is a certain way of
assuming, or taking on, that power. If, as Weeks puts it, gay men “gnaw at the
roots of a male homosexual identity,” it is not because of a paradistic distance
that they take from that identity, but rather because, from within their nearly
47
mad identification with it, they never cease to feel the appeal of its being violated.

In an attempt to simultaneously critique the manifestations of masculinity in
sexist human cultures, and also the pastoralization of sex in gay male political
identity, Bersani proposes a politics built through the masochism of dissolu48
tion. Though Halley is quite critical of a kind of celebration of male homosexual masochism and the imposition of the value-form onto sexuality, she none49
theless is attracted to the politics derived from it.
For her, Bersani’s idea,
slightly reformulated, allows for a sexuality unconfined in any way by the
50
value-form.
In spite of the fact that Bersani attributes value to characteristics of subordination, he does not conclude with a validation of queer identity manufactured
from what Wendy Brown might call “a state of injury” in which she looks to
identity formation functions “not as a supplement to class politics, not as an expansion of left categories of oppression and emancipation, not as an enriching
augmentation of progressive formulations of power and persons”—all of which
they also are— “but as tethered to a formulation of justice that reinscribes a
51
bourgeois (masculinist) ideal as its measure.” Rather, his concept of the “humiliation of the self” wrests subordination discourse from a bourgeois logic of
value and exchange in which the onto-phenomenological is reduced to a meas52
ure of regulation and exchangeability.
And his anti-identitarian and anticommunitarian stance thus allows for a critical agency and a politics which con53
tinue to undo normative sexual practice.
47. Bersani, supra note 1, at 209.
48. Id. at 218-222.
49. Halley, supra note 1, at 25.
50. Id. at 25-27.
51. See WENDY BROWN, STATES OF INJURY: POWER AND FREEDOM IN LATE MODERNITY 59 (1995).
52. Bersani, supra note 1, at 217-18.
53. This idea of the value-form is something discussed by Karl Marx and Gayatri Chakravorty
Spivak. See generally KARL MARX, 2 CAPITAL (Friedrich Engels ed., Samuel Moore & Edward Aveling
trans., 1885) (discussing the idea of value-form); Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Scattered Speculations
on the Question of Value, in IN OTHER WORLDS: ESSAYS IN CULTURAL POLITICS 154 (1987) (a brilliant
reading of notions of the value-form in relation to the onto-phenomenological). Alexander García
Düttman writes of the disunity of existence brought about through the violent dislocation that has
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But how does this critical agency function? And what relation does it bear
to reality-testing and the potential undoing of ego? Bersani derives his notion of
the violence of the “sanction for violence” enabled by the “practical ideal” of the
self elevated to “the status of an ethical ideal” from Freudian notions of sexual54
ity as well as of mourning, melancholia, and the super-ego. In Freud’s career, a
critical agency once associated with melancholia, or the failure to assimilate loss
into the ego through a form of reality-testing that confirms existence of the self
and death of the other, was eventually formulated as the possession of the su55
perego. Melancholia, in other words, was inadequately formulated according
to Freud, and he would soon move its characteristics into a different realm.
When he wrote Mourning and Melancholia in 1917, Freud proposed that the
mourner would be involved in the process of mourning for an extended length
56
of time and with great intensity.
As the mourner is involved in “reality57
testing,” there is a resistance to the fact of the loss. The withdrawal of all libido
from the object into the self meets with resistance, and often the mourner will
cling on to the idea that the thing lost is still present. For the mourner, however,
reality generally wins the day, and there is gradual withdrawal of the attachment, and a sustaining of the ego: “when the work of mourning is completed the
58
ego becomes free and uninhibited again.” The melancholic, on the other hand,
does not participate in any reality-testing, not least because the melancholic does
not know exactly what it is that has been lost. Even if the melancholic knows
that someone or something no longer exists, explains Freud, there is no knowledge of what exactly is lost in the process. Because no form of reality-testing can
clarify the nature of the loss, the melancholic turns inward. “In mourning it is
the world which has become poor and empty; in melancholia it is the ego it59
self.” The melancholic feels worthless, and becomes very self-critical, but this
self-criticism, or critical agency, is not the regulating super-ego that is turned in
toward the self in a way that would force into existence violently the sovereign
subject. The diseased self-critical agency has, rather, distorted the very existence
of “self.” Freud writes:
[L]et us dwell for a moment on the view which the melancholic’s disorder affords of the constitution of the human ego. We see how in him one part of the
ego sets itself over against the other, judges it critically, and, as it were, takes it
as its object. Our suspicion that the critical agency which is here split from the
ego might also show its independence in other circumstances will be confirmed
by every other observation. We shall really find grounds for distinguishing this
agency from the rest of the ego. What we are here becoming acquainted with is
the agency commonly called ‘conscience’; we shall count it, along with the cen-

characterized living in the time of AIDS. See generally Alexander García Düttman, AT ODDS WITH
AIDS: THINKING AND TALKING ABOUT A VIRUS (Peter Gilgen & Conrad Scott-Curtis trans., 1996).
54. FREUD, Mourning, supra note 29, at 243-58; FREUD, Ego, supra note 29, at 28-39.
55. See generally FREUD, Ego, supra note 29.
56. FREUD, Mourning, supra note 29, at 243-44.
57. Id. at 244-45.
58. Id. at 245. However, disavowal involves the acknowledgment through reality-testing of the
existence or non-existence of something, and a subsequent decision to ignore what reality-testing has
demonstrated. Id.
59. Id. at 246.
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sorship of consciousness and reality-testing, among the major institutions of the
ego, and we shall come upon evidence to show that it can be diseased on its own
60
account.

This elaboration of the “conscience” would become fully theorized some years
later in Freud’s essay The Ego and the Id, as the self-regulatory force of the super61
ego. But at the time of writing Mourning and Melancholia, Freud theorized this
critical agency as the affect created by an excess—the thing lost that can neither
62
be identified nor assimilated to the self as would be the case in mourning. The
critical relation toward the ego, and not in the guise of the ego-regulating superego, is exactly the force of the remainder. That remainder cannot be assimilated,
and it is viewed as “diseased” within the economy of the supremacy of the ego,
63
or indeed, the “moral masochism” of the superego. It cannot let go of that
which has been lost. Its future will always be shaped by the demands made on
it by the diseased critical agency, which in a sense causes a break in relation to
historical time.
Quite different from disavowal, in which the subject knows very well, melancholia embraces the unknown and undoes the ego in the process. Therefore
there is no real possibility of identification with the thing lost, even though there
is a “diseased” embrace between the disintegrating ego and the inassimilable
remainder. Through disintegration, the question of value itself is somewhat undermined. The “disidentification” with the ego controlled by the super-ego
cannot simply lead to the valuation of the subordinated. It is indeed the very
structure undone that is Bersani’s focus of interest. This is not the valuing of an
object. It is the refusal of the ego because of the problematic relation to the abject, inassimilable, lost and possibly repudiated object. Judith Butler’s Psychic
64
Life of Power has explored this form of disidentification extensively. For her, the
unknown lost object is homosexual desire, which threatens “the gendered char65
acter of the ego.” If gender and heterosexuality are built on the repudiation of
the homosexual, then one would have to acknowledge also the refusal of the
feminine which accompanies heterosexuality in the male. The girl child comes
into womanhood also through the repudiation of the feminine as first love ob66
ject, hence leading to the very problematic identification with the mother. Perhaps, however, the term disidenitification already suggests an ego and active resistance from it, rather than the dissolution I favor.
Douglas Crimp has written extensively on the “moralistic repudiation of
67
gay men in the pre-AIDS years” by post-AIDS queer theory. Identification
with a normative heterosexual order, which probably culminates in the demand
for the right of gay marriage, is a repudiation of the apparently “immature”

60. Id. at 247.
61. See generally FREUD, Ego, supra note 29.
62. FREUD, Mourning, supra note 29, at 245.
63. Bersani, supra note 1, at 218.
64. BUTLER, supra note 33, at 132-66.
65. Id. at 136.
66. Id.
67. CRIMP, supra note 27, at 9.
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68

years of gay life and has led to a highly regressive form of queer politics. The
condemnation of sexual practices and lifestyles that has accompanied AIDS discourse has of course done nothing to solve the problem of AIDS: it has func69
tioned to ignore those most vulnerable to the illness. Michael Warner has also
written extensively on the conservative and normative desire which has made
70
gay marriage the most public queer activist presence today. This brings up the
question more generally of progressive activism participating without skepticism in right discourse. I will discuss this more fully in what is to come. Brown
and Halley have also written on the problematic focus on rights that has charac71
terized much left activism in recent years.
Michael Warner’s book, The Trouble with Normal: Sex, Politics, and the Ethics
of Queer Life, interestingly invokes the category of ethics to counter the current
dominance in queer political discourse around marriage. For him, the ethical
position to take would be to critique gay marriage and the regressive trappings
72
of social respectability that go along with it. Following the psychoanalytic discourse we have been pursuing here, one could propose that this withdrawal
from social respectability can also, at its most radical, constitute the disintegration of the onto-phenomenological category of the ego. The critical agency of
melancholia would thus constitute not the normative categories of the law of the
ego, but rather the demand for pursuit of justice.
Halley’s decision to take a break from feminism cannot, I would suggest,
ultimately respond to the melancholic remainder that is most effective in wresting politics from the conservative constraints of the superego. In fact, her disavowal of feminism leaves no room for active critique. Disavowal is acting out
in relation to the failings of some forms of feminism, which seem to have failed
Halley. Halley’s peculiar endorsement of Bersani is that, unlike him, she remains in the realm of parodic acting out rather than an undoing of self through
the darkness of jouissance. In fact, this acting out is more of an assertion of selfhood and the moral prescription against pastoralized views of sex, than it is a
radical undoing. If queer, indeed, is an undoing of self, then this acting out is
functioning within a heterosexist paradigm involving identification with moral
violence. It takes no account at all of the value-form it endorses, because it cannot acknowledge the formative and problematic relation to the supplement.
Critical melancholia, rather, embodies the undoing of self and simultaneously
enacts the critique of self. We do not simply see the self undone. Self is undone
with the recognition of violence performed through the normative categories of
valuation, the onto-phenomenological, the subject, and the human.
What would a politics derived from this model of attention to the abjected
singularity of the melancholic embrace look like? And if I choose to call this
melancholic politics a form of feminist ethics, where exactly does this leave demands for rights that have so characterized feminist and queer activism in the
68. See id. at 1-26.
69. Id. at 43-82.
70. See generally MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL: SEX, POLITICS, AND THE ETHICS
OF QUEER LIFE (1999).
71. See generally Wendy Brown & Janet Halley, Introduction, in LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE 1
(Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002).
72. WARNER, supra note 70, at 81-148.
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recent past? If rights are indeed always compromised by a notion of the ontophenomenological built on the regressive features of the regulatory super-ego
and the value systems it represents, are we to do away with them entirely as
sources for legal pursuit? Halley, following Bersani, sees a politics derived from
the dissolution of the self as something peculiar to homosexuality rather than to
73
melancholia more generally. What would it mean to take this a step further,
and to have a politics built from the very undoing afforded through melancholia
of other sorts? When we acknowledge the singularity of sexuality in its current
relation to AIDS discourse, are we to abandon the legal to endless mourning,
never finding any possibility of a politics based on the concept of the human? In
the next section, I will attempt to sketch out what this politics may look like.
III. THE PROBLEM OF RIGHTS AND THE QUESTION OF JUSTICE: FEMINIST
MELANCHOLIA AND THE REMAINDER
Human rights, and more particularized forms of named rights, such as
women’s rights, gay rights, or animal rights, have a complicated relationship,
not least because the demand for rights does not always have a following in the
political realms of feminism, queer activism, or animal liberation. One could
obviously say that the distinction between animal rights and human rights is
different from that between women’s rights or gay rights and human rights for
the simple reason that animals are not human, and presumably do not aspire to
be, whereas women and gays are human, and on one level at least, do not, therefore, have to aspire to be. I say “on one level,” because the categories of
women’s and gay rights functions as a supplement to that of human rights in a
manner that suggests a “becoming human” of woman and homosexuals—that
is, attaining the status by which there will be an inclusion of their rights into the
category of human rights. Perhaps the notion of human rights is itself “humanized,” as it were, through accommodating women and homosexuals within its
realm. But the lesson of a term like animal rights and the obvious inability to
include the animal into a notion of human rights points toward the lesson of the
critique of human rights discourse more generally: the liberal critique which argues for inclusion or accommodation, and the Marxist and deconstructive critiques which take issue with the forms of universalism implied in the notion of
human qualifying that idea of “rights.” At the heart of the issue of “rights,” especially in the international realm, is that of difference, and of course not merely
cultural difference or difference in lifestyle.
An ethico-political notion of reading informs my understanding of the pursuit of international justice. Feminism, like queer studies, enters this ethicopolitical reading practice as a means of understanding how some continue consistently to be unaccounted for in this pursuit. This notion of the ethico-political
involves both an understanding of an abstracted form of practice, and a concrete
relation to the other. Deconstruction has given us the reading tools to make this
pursuit, and I think it can be as relevant to queer theories as much as feminist
ones. Reading involves not only attention to the parameters and laws of genre,
context, and means of production, though it involves all of these; it also involves

73.

Halley, supra note 1, at 25-27.
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being open to the singularity of the text, that which exceeds the identifiable particularities at hand, and encountering something unsettling which seems to exist
beyond those laws. Deconstructionist reading, put to work in the pursuit of justice, would not necessarily endorse a “belief” in the notion of human rights,
even though it could be through a more overt political notion of how to address
“wrongs.” As Spivak has pointed out, there is an asymmetry between the no74
tion of the human in the idea of human rights and human wrongs, in the sense
that human wrongs concern injustice performed by humans, and the notion of
rights seem to “belong” to the human qua human. The questions that arise, of
course, are what constitutes human beings, and on what grounds rights are determined for them. Even if the notion of human rights is designed to offer an
ethical and legal neutral standard for equal treatment under the law, it is clear
that those rights seem often arbitrarily chosen, contingent, and far from neutral
at the moment of their inception. At their inception they are groundless other
than through politics and its notion of the citizen-subject or human.
This is one of the many lessons Jacques Derrida, the franco-maghrebi deconstructive philosopher, gives us in his essay, Force of Law, originally a talk written
75
for presentation at the Cardozo Law School. He argues that once a law is in
place, there can be determinations made concerning its enforceability, legiti76
macy, and whether it has been broken. It creates its own guidelines, even in
instances in which these are highly debatable. He refers us back, however, to
the moment at which the law is established, when there is no foundation as such
for it, and when the sovereign, violently exempting “himself” from legal enforcement, determines what laws are employed and subsequently enforced on
others. Law may seem like a stable entity built on a hefty foundation, but as
soon as one looks at its origins, that foundation is revealed as either mystical or
77
arbitrary, or both.
However, rather than feel despair about this baselessness of the law, the
recognition that it is without foundation, legal or otherwise, is paradoxically the
moment in which it is revealed as political rather than ethical. The mode of assessment, critique, or reading, thus shifts. One is left without a stable means of
justification, value assignment, response, or indeed alibi. For no foregone ethical standards unquestionably provide the basis for action, response, or intervention, humanitarian or otherwise. Responsibility becomes based on the ability to
respond to the singularity of the other, of a situation, or of an event. It involves
a political determination in the public space opened up through difference, that
is, through the understanding of the singularity of the other that does not fit into
any preestablished rules, the recognition that “the other,” for example, will always constitute more than an example of the general rubric employed to understand it.
It has sometimes been said that such a reading constitutes its own alibi: it
gives an excuse, or a pretext, for ignoring the historico-political foundation of

74. See Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Righting Wrongs, in HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMAN WRONGS 168,
168-69 (Nicholas Owen ed., 2003).
75. JACQUES DERRIDA, Force of Law, in ACTS OF RELIGION 228 (Gil Anidjar ed., 2002).
76. Id. at 251-52.
77. Id. at 269.
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“other” subjects, that is, what Michel Foucault, at the end of The History of Sexuality, has described as the turning of politics into biopolitics: the moment in which
life, or natural life, becomes the terrain upon which the state’s power is played
78
out. He writes, “[f]or millennia, man remained what he was for Aristotle: a living animal with the additional capacity for a political existence.” “[M]odern
man,” he adds, “is an animal whose politics places his existence as a living being
79
in question.” Asking us to consider the disciplinary control of what have become, through state enforcement, docile bodies to be manipulated, Foucault im80
plores us to understand the genealogy of the mechanisms of biopower. One
strand of feminism, especially in literary analysis, has been to locate the rules
governing that biopower. Even as this may be necessary, there is no reason why
that Foucaultian biopolitical analysis would necessarily open one up to the
other, to the extent that the recognition of the other’s singularity could constitute
something like a risk for the observer, a challenge, or indeed damage to the
frame of rules one lives by. It is indeed necessary to understand the mechanisms of biopower, they keep one honest as it were, like the qualifiers of rights
like “gays’,” “women’s,” or “animal’s” to remind us of the forms of life so frequently and persistently or, indeed, structurally performed in the instrumentali81
zation of community-based or “human” rights.
And the understanding of
those mechanisms is of course crucial to one’s responsibility to the other. Alone,
however, biopolitical understanding is a necessary but insufficient response, or
an abrogation of the ability to respond to the other in the pursuit of justice for
all.
So how does one move toward the possibility of justice for all in the experience of the impossibility of this? How can one guarantee justice once one has
moved away from an established rubric, like that of human rights, which has
historically been so arbitrary in its designation of those it possibly protects, and
its notion of the subject overshadowed as it is by the value-form imposed onto
the onto-phenomenological? “Cultural difference” consistently becomes a sticking point in human rights discourse, most clearly when the status of women
with cultural origins outside the first world are at stake, having “wrongs” performed against them. All too often, “cultural difference” becomes an alibi that
guarantees the “reader’s” own politics—status and value go unquestioned.
(This is the problem of liberalism generally, and most strikingly in Rawlsian liberalism in which the subject is presumed to be rational and individualist, and
82
any awkward question of difference is relegated to the realm of the private. It
is also consistently a problem in Habermasian notions of the public sphere in
which difference and antagonism can similarly be negotiated only through his

78. MICHEL FOUCAULT, HISTORY OF SEXUALITY VOLUME I: AN INTRODUCTION 137-45 (Robert
Hurley trans., 1978).
79. Id. at 143.
80. Id. at 135-59.
81. Jacques Derrida is particularly insistent on this point. Derrida, supra note 75, at 257.
82. In THE LAW OF PEOPLES (1999), John Rawls attempts to revise some of the ideas proposed in
his book, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971), to apply to a more international realm, and to therefore take
the fact of difference into account. The perspective, however, does not really change his relegation
of difference to the private and his assumption of a “decent” people. See generally RAWLS, IN THE
LAW OF PEOPLES, supra.
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version of the rational, in this case, a notion of what constitutes rational dis83
course).
In short, there are no guarantees and no alibis. Justice has to be a movement and a constant renegotiation of its political grounds. Difference, after all,
is not only cultural difference, and it cannot be addressed without opening oneself potentially to challenge from the other. Queer theory, no less than any other
ethico-political formation, would similarly have to abandon any fixed notion of
sexuality as revolutionary in terms of debasement at its core. Bersani does not
make this error. He writes, “to want sex with another man is not exactly a cre84
dential for political radicalism.” An example of the problem is that much of
even the most progressive work on sexuality and AIDS does not venture to
think sexuality beyond European and North American contexts.
But critique shows us the erroneous at best and tyrannical at worst complacency that the notion of the human as it is employed in human rights and “humanitarian intervention” consistently allows. For example, even prior to the
current war in Iraq, discussion of the “humanitarian” intervention of the United
Nations (UN) relegated it to the position of hospital, rather than political player.
So the war in the United States and British governments’ discourse gets erroneously rationalized because of agreement to “care” after Iraq is once again ripped
apart through the instruments of sovereign power and the state of exception.
No form of humanitarian work has changed the way in which prisoners are
rendered as caged animals in Guantanamo Bay. For another example, Kofi Annan gets promoted to Secretary General in spite of the fact that he is directly responsible for UN inaction during the horrifying Rwanda genocide. Reporting
on human wrongs, transparency, and the institutionalization of liberal notions
of the human is incontrovertibly no guarantee of any humanitarian advancement; in fact in practice it all too often seems quite the opposite when the powerful relegation of some to the status of non-human seems permissible. Another
example is that the status of women in Afghanistan, though admittedly atrocious, was used as a humanitarian justification for war, while women’s demands
85
were consistently ignored, and the war ultimately resulted in very little change.
“Humanist” notions of empathy were shown to have failed as a foundation of
ethical response in Bosnia, when genocide was played out on (and perhaps assisted through) television screens internationally, eliciting no guarantees for ac86
tion and the protection of life.
Liberalism is consistently anti-political in its preference for terms like “humanity” and “universalism” as opposed to “the people,” “the event,” “the situation,” “the citizenry,” and “the international.” Etienne Balibar, in his reading of
the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen calls our attention to that tension between man and citizen, asking whether one is designated human with
access to rights because one is a citizen, or whether one is citizen because one

83. See generally JÜRGEN HABERMAS, MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATIVE ACTION
(Christian Lenhardt & Shierry Weber Nicholsen trans., 1990).
84. Bersani, supra note 1, at 205.
85. See Ranjana Khanna, Taking a Stand for Afghanistan: Women and the Left, 28 SIGNS 464, 464-65
(2002).
86. Thomas Keenan, Publicity and Indifference (Sarajevo on Television), 117 PMLA 1, 104 (2002).
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has access to human rights. Hannah Arendt tried to solve this problem by demanding citizenship for all, legitimating everyone as human with access to
88
rights. Writing of refugees, she criticized the concept of an ethical humanity in
89
favor of political international democracy. Like Balibar many years later, Arendt draws on the scandal of the separation between human and citizen in the
90
Declaration of 1789. She writes:
No paradox of contemporary politics is filled with a more poignant irony than
the discrepancy between the efforts of well-meaning idealists who stubbornly
insist on regarding as “inalienable” those human rights, which are enjoyed only
by citizens of the most prosperous and civilized countries, and the situation of
the rightless themselves. Their situation has deteriorated just as stubbornly, until the internment camp—prior to the Second World War the exception rather
91
than the rule for the stateless—has become the routine solution . . .

Arendt was discussing those who had no citizenship, but we could claim the
analytical critique for all those who demand particularized rights that seem to
function as a supplement to human rights. Yet Arendt’s solution seems inadequate to the task of pursuing justice, because the logic of rights and citizenship,
and indeed of the human, always leave a remainder or supplement, and are thus
always held hostage to the normalization that takes place in the process of becoming citizen, and the psychical consequences of that.
The psychoanalytic construction of the subject was constituted through the
colonial relation, at the time of the consolidation of the European nation-state,
and the melancholic subject was one constituted through a critical agency that
had already lost the ideal of nation-statehood, corrupted (and constituted) as it
was through the colonial relation. This melancholic subject effectively became a
92
non-subject. The melancholic relation exists as a result of the loss of an ideal.
In the context of colonialism, this ideal was often the idea of the nation-state, the
sovereign subject, and sovereignty within the nation-state. If European nationstates were formulated out of their relation to the colonies, then those states always required a supplement within which sovereignty cannot be achieved. The
ideal of freedom and sovereignty for all embedded in the ideology of the nationstate was thus always a contradiction that could be seen in the existence of the
colonies. That existence always existed within the context of the “supplement”
to the nation-state, that is, the colony. Those non-subjects within the colonies
were to conceive the possibility of their sovereignty and their coming into subjecthood through the ideal of nationhood which appeared to give everyone the
possibility of relative sovereignty and citizenship. That supplement, however,
not recognized as such, was to always undo the postcolonial subject, revealing
the critical gap between the manifest instantiation of nation, citizen, law, repre-

87. ETIENNE BALIBAR, Rights of Man and Rights of the Citizen: the Modern Dialectic of Equality and
Freedom, in MASSES, CLASSES, IDEAS: STUDIES ON POLITICS AND PHILOSOPHY BEFORE AND AFTER MARX
39, 44-50 (James Swenson trans., 1994).
88. HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 302 (1979).
89. Id. at 267-302.
90. Id. at 298-99.
91. Id. at 279.
92. For a more extensive discussion of this idea see KHANNA, supra note 37.
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sented, and valued, and the melancholic supplement. Having manifestly lost
the ideal of nationhood, without realizing exactly what had been lost, the mel93
ancholic “non-subject of the political” would always perform the critical
agency that would critique its attachment to the ideal. The remaindered trace
would always manifest a slippage that demands something different for the inadequate political. The melancholic insistence of that trace would reveal the
ethical, justice, subaltern, and use that the political could never respond to. The
demand of the melancholic, whose critical agency runs counter to the normalizing disavowal which is the property of the superego, is the call for justice.
If feminism has too often been associated with the repressive nature of
normalizing moralism, as well as colonial and racial violence in its historical
constitution, being responsible to the not human will involve a simultaneous attentiveness to the demands of that unknowable entity, woman, however she is
defined. This does not mean valuing everything women think, feel, or want, or
demanding the right on behalf of women as if it were progressive. Feminism,
no more or less than queer activism and theory, could constitute the space of
hope, marked as it is by its own history of violence, and its own specters de94
manding justice.
Though melancholia is about the critical agency that challenges the normative onto-phenomenological structure of the ego, it is not unquestionably ethical
or just, and it would be naive to think of politics marked by melancholia as inherently radical and untouched by normative and regressive politics. It is certainly not the case that a psychical, physical, or juridical investment in homosexuality automatically amounts to the absence of gendered, sexual, racial, or
capitalist violence and prejudice. The melancholic, after all, is something of a
wretched figure precisely because of the weight of the normative value system
upon which ego-constitution rests, and exactly an ambivalent response to the
lost object. The question of value, however full the power of critique brought
against it, as Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak has suggested, will always include
95
“the impossibility of a full undoing.” As I have explained elsewhere, “a psychic contingency in the present embodies within it the persistence of history . . .
96
not simply as fantasy or as memory, but also as archive distinct from memory.”
The melancholic’s undoing of the ego, however, manifests alterity and thus the
call for justice. And it is not, as in the case with Bersani and Halley, the exclu97
sive property of queer politics.

93. This phrase comes from Alberto Moreiras’ work in progress, and I thank him for having
given me the opportunity to discuss the topic with him.
94. While I greatly admire the work of Gillian Rose, I find her frustration with contemporary
work on mourning and melancholia to exaggerate the nihilism in what she refers to as “postmodern
thinking.” Her works, MOURNING BECOMES THE LAW: PHILOSOPHY AND REPRESENTATION (1996) and
DIALECTIC OF NIHILISM: POST-STRUCTURALISM AND LAW (1984), see only an undoing in the form of
critique proposed through deconstruction, and no possibility of a space of politics.
95. Spivak, supra note 32, at 154.
96. See KHANNA, supra note 37, at 228.
97. In a more recent essay, Bersani has called his notion of a politics built on masochism as irresponsible, failing as it does to produce any idea of sociality through which a politics could emerge.
Perhaps, however, ethico-political relation to the other, centered around the idea of melancholia,
would inevitably remain attached to the social, as it is the self that becomes impoverished as one
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The undoing of the ego present in the structure of melancholia is always a
dual negotiation between dissolution of the ego and simultaneously attachment
to it and the names to which it remains attached. Melancholia is not just about
coming undone, of course, it is always about the critical relation outside of the
moralism of the superego. Halley, following Bersani, sees gay men as never
98
ceasing to feel the appeal of its (their identity) being violated. I propose that
acknowledging the singularity of this position does not demand a sense of the
exclusivity of queer theory understanding the import of the dissolution of the
99
ego, and the moral violence of both the value form and the super-ego. Perhaps
the question of queer and feminist are simply issues of semantics. But, for a
reader, naming, semantics, and signatures are never really that simple.
IV. THE SIGNATURE
Jacques Derrida, speaking of AIDS, says:
If I spoke a moment ago of an event and of indestructibility, it is because already, at the dawn of this very new and ever so ancient thing, we know that,
even should humanity some day come to control the virus (it will take at least a
generation), still, even in the most unconscious symbolic zones, the traumatism
has irreversibly affected our experience of desire and of what we blithely call in100
tersubjectivity, the relation to the alter ego, and so forth.

He is, of course, pointing to the remainder that will always exist concerning the
trauma of AIDS and its massive effects and disruption on all “symbolic zones,”
undoing any notion of humanity that existed prior to the event, or any notion of
history outside that of the traumatic break brought about through the impossibility of understanding AIDS. Regulated notions of temporality and stable notions of the human come undone. And in itself recognition of a change that is
mired in melancholia and countless remainders, comes a responsibility to the
other, to the remainder, to that which contaminates.
This, I would propose, is the manifestation of critical melancholia. It is not
only the trauma of AIDS discussed here, amounting to a change in subjecthood;
rather, it is a radical change in relationality and subjectivity marked by the singular and unique event of AIDS. AIDS has left its signature on any kind of subjectivity or dissolution we could begin to imagine. An ethical relation to it for
Derrida involves being undone by the event, even when it becomes curable. A
melancholic ethico-politics must always be attentive to the remainder. The remainder is the thing apparently lost which cannot be identified as such. No
form of complete mourning becomes possible, nor any form of a rejected or disavowed reality. The remainder that insists itself will always be that which unsuspends oneself in the other’s text, according to Freud, and not the world. See Leo Bersani, Sociality
and Sexuality, 26 CRITICAL INQUIRY 641, 641-56 (2000); FREUD, Mourning, supra note 29, at 246.
98. Halley, supra note 1, at 15-17.
99. Bersani, supra note 1, at 209. Such attachment to the remainder and its undoing of the subject is also not only a factor in the deconstructive thought of Jacques Derrida. We similarly see this
tension in such post-Marxist thinkers like Jean-Luc Nancy. See generally JEAN-LUC NANCY, THE
INOPERATIVE COMMUNITY (Peter Conner et al. trans., 1991).
100. Jacques Derrida, The Rhetoric of Drugs, in POINTS . . . : INTERVIEWS 1974-1994 228, 251 (Elisabeth Weber ed., Peggy Kamuf et al. trans., 1995).

080204 KHANNA2.DOC

90 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY

9/17/2004 9:27 AM

Volume 11:69

2004

does any definitive constitution of selfhood. The remainder always undoes the
frame we establish for ourselves.
Halley, although, following Bersani, endorses the peculiar ways in which a
politics may emerge from queer sexuality, and ultimately acts out a reinscription
101
of subjectivity through her rejection of feminism. And she does this through
the signature of Ian, as if that signature did not carry the trace of Janet. Perhaps
this is parody, but why does it manifest itself for Ian in the rejection, or breaking
away from Janet? The move from Janet to Ian is equivalent to the movement
from feminist to queer. This notion of what is “queer” functions in terms of the
copula. Woman and feminist are of course not equivalents, other than in the
moral violence of heterosexist aggression, and the normative values built
through the superego’s aggressive division of the sexes. There is no reason for
Ian to stop being Janet. Ian’s signature carries the trace of Janet, just as queer
theory carries the trace of feminism.
Ian’s signature carries the trace of something else in it, and this notion of
queer as carrying the trace of the past, of difference, and of remainder carries
with it the “impossibility of a full undoing.” Neither Janet nor Ian can become
completely undone within a melancholic framework, precisely because the critical agency will always be in the relation of critique of the self, undoing and yet
reminding of the remainder of self. Ian seems to want to write as if a signature
really can do the work of sustaining self-identity, coherence, prior and future existence in the realm of the same and continuous, all of which is put into doubt
102
by the very necessity of it.
Ian has not put feminism into question, he has
acted out through disavowal. He has effectively rejected the critical relation in
favor of abandonment, and has shored up his selfhood in the process. He has
repeated and reinforced a heterosexist framework, and through disavowal has
parodied melancholia as a radical and critical undoing of self.
Disavowal, the ignoring of the trace, cannot realize the undoing of self that
occurs in melancholia. Halley is essentially saying, “I know very well about the
existence of Janet, but even so, I choose to disregard her and let Ian speak for
me.” The signature, while proposing a being that may have been there at the
time of writing, and may not have been, nonetheless calls upon the proper name
and its gendered identifications. The signature leaves a trace of singularity,
even as it is lost as the enunciating communicator. The signature, by its very nature, is always a copy, and a trace of it is assumed to exist elsewhere, designating as it does the absence of the signatory. What is absent always throws some
doubt on the assurance apparently afforded through the signature. Ian carries
in him the trace of Janet, and she poses a question about why identification with
the masculine has occurred. The trace of her allows for the possibility of critique, and it also undoes both Ian and Janet as stable entities. In doing so, s/he
is able to speak.
The impossibility of signature in my title refers not to the ways in which it
is at times not possible to sign, so much as the ways in which the signature always carries within it the very undoing of its task of sustaining continuity, and
maintaining particularity. The written text itself will always be singular in the
101.
102.

See Halley, supra note 1, at 26-27.
See DERRIDA, Signature, supra note 7, at 19-21.
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way traces of the other are manifested. Acknowledging the affective connection
to the other while simultaneously beginning to work it through, is the melancholic’s job. Ian’s plea to take a break from feminism needs to be seen as an acting out of disavowal unable to acknowledge a relation and unable to perform
critique. There is no argument made in Halley’s article which proposes a reason
to ignore the demands made by the questions and the repressions of sexisms in
all their complexities. The possibility of critique is entirely foreclosed, somewhat paradoxically for a piece of celebratory support of queer sexuality that endorses the moral violence of the value-form.
Gillian Rose, writing rather despairingly of the melancholic nature of contemporary theory, proposes replacing the lament of the trauerspiel or tragedy
103
with the possibilities of comedy. She may well have overstated the case, but it
does seem that the genre of comedy did allow for a breaking out of character to
make a political statement. In Greek Comedy this was referred to as parabasis.
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak in A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a History
of the Vanishing Present calls for “a permanent parabasis,” the breaking out of a
104
frame for direct (and non-representative) political commentary. This breaking
out of the frame, the attempt to recognize the trace as the undoing of self, and
the consequent effort to responsible openness and to constant critique, is what
makes feminism for me a justice seeking project. Working with the law, and always critiquing it, feminism moves with and against an idea of the human, the
ego, the sexed and gendered subject, and the proper name designated in a signature or the ownership of copyright.
V. CONCLUSION
A ruthlessly vigilant and constant ethico-politics informed by feminism,
and a reading practice open to the other includes all notions of alterity, animal,
human, or otherwise. In its focus on singularity, there can be no set of consistent
rules applied to a substitutable other in the name of neutrality. Rather, the
reader is marked as substitutable in his or her openness to the singularity and
particularity of the other. It opens one up to the necessity of change through a
politics without alibi, and a challenge to the forms of violation performed in our
name and to our economic benefit. It is through this understanding of the relation between the particular and the singular that we can move toward justice. It
is only in this relation that responsible acts and ethico-political writing can take
place.

103.
104.

ROSE, supra note 37, at 63-76.
GAYATRI CHAKRAVORTY SPIVAK, A CRITIQUE OF POSTCOLONIAL REASON: TOWARD A HISTORY
OF THE VANISHING PRESENT 430 (1999).

